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I. Introduction  
In the aftermath of the 1997 East Asian financial crisis, the government of the Republic 
of Korea published a private participation in infrastructure (PPI) Act in order to remove 
the main impediments to private investment in infrastructure sectors. The 
implementation of the Act was followed by a steady increase in the number of PPI 
projects, thus spurring the modernization of the main infrastructure facilities in transport, 
water, electricity and telecommunications. Despite this progress, the Korean PPI market 
still faces critical challenges that are probably related to its nascent stage of 
development. The market is dominated by five construction and engineering firms, but 
lacks world-class project developers. At the same time, the procurement of PPI projects 
takes on average four years, and competition in tenders is limited. The number of 
unsolicited proposals is abnormally high, whereas the number of solicited proposals 
remains flat. The participation of foreign firms is very limited despite the size of the 
market and the number of projects awarded. Although local financing is available, the 
maturity of financing instruments does not exceed five years for most corporate papers, 
and ten years for government bonds (Dailami, 2004).  
The paper reviews the procurement of PPI projects in Korea and benchmarks it to 
international best practices before proposing options for its improvement. However, the 
paper does not thoroughly review the legal, institutional, capacity building and policy 
aspects that encompass the procurement of PPI projects. The remainder of the paper is 
organized in two sections. The first section begins by reviewing specific characteristics 
of PPI projects before discussing the main issues that are likely to affect the success of 
PPI project tenders. Section 2 reviews the development of PPI projects in Korea and 
more specifically discusses how these projects should be procured in order to achieve the 
development objectives. 
II. International experience in the procurement of PPI projects 
PPI projects are not contemporary innovations. King Henry II of France granted the first 
PPI project to an individual, Adam de Craponne, for the construction of a canal in 1554. 
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The United Kingdom has granted operating licenses since 1609 (Spiller and Vogelsang, 
1993). These licenses were initially granted by the King and the parliament subsequently 
took over this role. There are also many examples supporting private sector involvement 
in the development of infrastructure facilities and related services in developed and 
developing countries. For example, in the early days of the industrial revolution, many 
governments (local or central) granted concessions to the private sector for the 
construction and operation of public facilities such as canals, railroads, roads, bridges, 
and utilities. Overall, PPI projects developed on a large scale as early as the beginning of 
the 19th century along with the diffusion of utility services to households. This section 
reviews the main characteristics of PPI projects before discussing issues affecting their 
procurement. The section provides examples and references to international best practices 
observed in the procurement of PPI projects during the past 15 years. 
A. Specific characteristics of PPI projects  
In this paper, we define PPI projects as rights granted by governments (central, state or 
local) to private parties in order to build and operate infrastructure facilities to provide a 
set of defined services during a period of time and receive associated revenues. As 
defined here, PPI projects may or may not involve pre-existing government assets and 
entail the issuance by governments of concession contracts or operating licenses. 
Consequently, the procurement of PPI projects is identical to the procurement of 
infrastructure concessions even though the latter term may have different meanings 
depending on the country’s legal tradition or endowment. For instance, in civil law 
countries such as France, the term concession is often associated to service delegations 
involving the construction and the operation of public facilities such as roads, railways, 
water, electricity and telecommunications. However, there is a fundamental difference 
between the procurement of PPI projects and the procurement of civil works. The paper 
assumes that the procurement of civil works involves construction or maintenance 
contracts. On the contrary, the procurement of PPI projects involves the construction and 
operation of infrastructure facilities in order to provide specified services. A second 
difference stems from the fact that PPI projects fall within the regime of private law 
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contracts2, whereas civil works are governed by administrative law contracts. Private law 
contracts ensure equivalent rights and obligations to contracting parties. For example, a 
private contract cannot be changed unless both parties agree to do so. Similarly, parties 
rely on the judiciary to protect their rights in case of a breach of contract. Conversely, 
administrative contracts are asymmetric in the sense that governments will usually have 
exorbitant rights. For example, governments will not need a judiciary decision before 
modifying or canceling a civil work contract or enforcing penalties in case of default.  
 
Besides, infrastructure networks exhibit characteristics of natural monopoly. A highway 
linking city A to city B may be the only economically available route between these two 
cities. If conceded to a private entity, the concessionaire will hold a natural monopoly 
over the roadway between cities A and B even if the provision of transportation services 
remains competitive. The same applies to the distribution of water and electricity 
services. When a city decides to grant the distribution of water or electricity services to 
one concessionaire, there is little room left to develop competition in the market. 
Granting concessions in infrastructure sectors therefore entails monopoly or exclusive 
rights. In order to minimize monopoly rents captured by concessionaires, Sir Edwin 
Chadwick recommended in 1859 to promote wherever possible “competition for the 
market”. He went on recommending that concessions rights be auctioned to the bidder 
offering the most attractive terms – for example the lowest price to consumers. In 
resurrecting Chadwick’s idea, Harold Demsetz (1968) advocated in favor of periodic re-
bidding of concession contracts in order to extract monopoly rents prevailing after the 
concession has been awarded. But one has to admit that re-bidding is not always a 
practical solution specially when assets are very specific to the concession or cannot be 
easily disbanded in a secondary market. In such a situation, re-bidding is not a practical 
solution3 because of critical incentives problems that arise (Laffont and Tirole, 1993; 
                                                 
2 For example, the government may have the privilege to terminate the contract at any time without relying 
on a judiciary decision. This is the case in most civil law countries such as France. 
3 In France, only 12% of the incumbent water concessionaires lost their renewing bids in 2000 (see 
ENGREF, 2001) compared to 8% in 1998 and 18% in 1999. Due to the limited terms of delegation 
contracts (on average 11 years in water concession or lease), ENGREF has found that out of 336 renewing 
contracts in 2000: (a) independent operators won 8 new contracts, (b) altogether the three main private 
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Williamson 1976). Conversely, when assets are not specific to the concession, re-bidding 
can be a practical solution to the monopoly problem. For example, garbage collection 
concessions are often re-bid periodically. If the incumbent loses, she can simply transfer 
assets and staff to another purpose. 
 
Most contemporary PPI projects are therefore procured using competitive tenders or 
standard auctions, but what differentiates auctions from tenders is hard to say. In this 
paper, we define a tender as a competitive bidding process that reflects one or a 
combination of the features discussed in Box 1. For instance, the sale of new rights in oil, 
gas, mining and telecommunications sectors (spectrum blocks, oil exploration permits, 
minerals concessions, etc.) is often based on ascending or first price sealed-bid auctions.  
But, there are specific circumstances, such as natural disasters, for which governments 
are probably better off negotiating directly with a restricted number of preferred bidders. 
However, direct negotiations are time consuming and require specialized skills that most 
governments in developing countries do not have. For example, it took the government of 
Morocco four years to close a “gré à gré” agreement for the Casablanca water 
concession, whereas the Tétouan – Tanger (Morocco) water concessions which were 
granted using a competitive tender were closed in 15 months. 
                                                                                                                                                 
water operators (Ondeo, Veolia, Saur) won 89% of the renewing contracts. Overall, the renewing procedure 
has ended in a change of operator only in 12% of the cases. 
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B. Main issues in bidding out PPI projects 
This sub-section primarily focuses on critical issues which are likely to deter the success 
of competitive tenders organized to procure PPI projects. The sub-section does not 
discuss broader institutional issues such as setting-up PPI units, developing legislation to 
promote PPI, or ensuring effective inter-governmental coordination. The sub-section 
more specifically addresses the following issues: encouraging participation and 
competition in bidding, ensuring certainty and predictability in the bidding process, 
ensuring the adequacy of the bidding process to the political and social context, ensuring 
effective regulation after the project has been awarded, and selecting a bidding process 
which can better address most of these concerns.  
1. Participation and competition in bidding 
A good tender should encourage the participation of credible bidders. Whether the goal is 
economic efficiency, maximum revenues or lowest costs, competition in tenders is 
necessary but not sufficient to achieve the development outcomes attached to PPI 
projects. One of the important deterrents to competition in tenders is the high cost of 
preparing compliant bids. The costs of preparing compliant bids include the costs 
Box 1: Main types of auctions. 
 
• Ascending (English) and descending (Dutch) auctions are oral – open auctions, whereas first 
and second price auctions are sealed-bid auctions. 
• In ascending auctions, the price is successively raised until only one bidder remains, and that 
bidder wins the object at the final price.  
• On the contrary, in descending auctions, the seller starts at a very high price and lowers the 
price continuously. The first bidder who calls out and accepts the current price wins the object 
at that price.  
• In first price sealed-bid auctions each bidder independently submits a single bid without 
seeing others’ bids. The object is sold to the bidder who makes the highest bid.  
• In second price sealed-bid auctions, each bidder independently submits a single bid without 
seeing others’ bids and the object is sold to the bidder who makes the highest bid whereas she 
will pay the object at the price proposed by the second highest bid.  
• In fact, many variants of auctions exist. For instance, the Anglo-Dutch auction combines the 
English auction and the first price sealed-bid auction to give an hybrid auction which captures 
the best features of both. In Anglo-Dutch auctions, the seller begins by running an ascending 
auction in which the price is raised continuously until all but two bidders have dropped out. 
The two remaining bidders are then asked to make a final sealed-bid offer that is not lower 
than the current asking price, and the winner pays this price. 
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associated with the hiring of financial, legal, technical and economic advisors. These 
costs can be as high as US$5million for complex or large scale projects.  
 
There is a correlation between the time allowed to prepare compliant bids and the quality 
of bids submitted, but, the lengthier becomes the bidding process, the higher are 
uncertainties faced by bidders. Tender rules and procedures should therefore reconcile the 
need to provide enough time for the preparation of compliant bids, and the need to 
complete the bidding process in a reasonable timeline. Tender documents should 
therefore provide accurate and consistent specifications about the service to be provided 
by the project developer. But, it is important to bear in mind that the procurement of PPI 
projects is a time consuming process. In Europe, the average timeline observed for light 
rail or road concession projects varies between 72 to 88 weeks4. In South Africa, PPI 
procurement guidelines recommend a timeline between 34 and 90 weeks. Clearly, the 
issue at stake is to implement a streamlined bidding process which is supported by clear 
and sound rules and procedures5. In the case of the desalination water Build Operate and 
Transfer (BOT) project in Israel (see Box 2), the government completed the process in 52 
weeks, even though the two-stage bidding process included a third round during which 
preferred bidders had to submit their best available final offers. 
 
For complex and very costly projects, it is often argued that governments should 
reimburse a portion or the totality of bids’ preparation costs. There is no conclusive 
recommendation on this sensitive issue although it is important to restate the rule of 
thumb that bids should be prepared at bidders’ costs and risks. However, in specific 
circumstances, the government can consider reimbursing a portion of the bids’ 
preparation costs. For example, some years ago the Greek government agreed to 
reimburse bidding preparation costs to unsuccessful bidders participating to the tender 
                                                 
4 A study published by the European Union finds that the average procurement time was:  (a) 22.3 months 
for Tram and light rail PPI projects (upper bound: 30 months, Lower bound: 13 months), (b) 18 months for 
roads PPI projects (upper bound: 20, lower bound: 15). Source: Official Journal of European Communities. 
5 One anonymous reviewer suggests that the emphasis should be on the process of bid evaluation and 
contract award, because a protracted process of bid evaluation could undermine the transparency of the 
tender. We think that a streamlined bidding process underlined by sound rules and procedures will not only 
preserve bids’ sanctity but will also ensure bidding predictability, and certainty, and should allow enough 
time for the evaluation of competing bids. 
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organized for the concession of the Athens airport6. In South Africa, PPP guidelines 
recommend inversely reimbursing a portion of bids’ preparation costs only to bidders 
submitting compliant bids. 
Box 2: Timeline of the Ashkelon BOT project in Israel 
In 2001 the Water Desalination Authority (WDA) launched a 24-year and 11-month BOT tender for the 
construction and the operation of a 50 million m3 desalination plant in Ashkelon. The plant capacity was to 
be off-taken by the government of Israel.  After a pre-qualification stage, three major international players 
involving local firms were selected to participate in the final bidding stage as outlined below: 
- February 2001 (end of Month 1): Issuance of the final BOT agreement 
- Month 4: Initial date of Bid submission 
- Mid- month 7: Bid submission 
- Month 8: Best And Final Offer (BAFO) and the project was awarded to Vivendi Water (now Veolia) the 
very same day 
- Month 11: Selection of the arranger 
- Month 12: Extension of the project scope to 100,000,000 m3 by authorities 
- Month 13: Signature of the BOT Agreement; finalization of detailed design by the project’s sponsors 
- Month 25: Financial close; start of construction. 
Source: Veolia Water (2003) 
2. Certainty and predictability of the bidding process 
Bidders dislike uncertainties. In general, most of the uncertainties observed in bidding 
processes stem from loopholes included in bidding procedures or documents. Bidders 
spend time and resources to review bidding documents while preparing their bids. The 
more bidding documents include loopholes or inconsistencies, the costlier becomes the 
preparation of compliant bids. Furthermore, bidders also exploit these inconsistencies and 
loopholes to their advantage as illustrated in Box 3.  
 
Box 3: Telecom auction in Turkey 
In 2000, Turkey auctioned two telecom licenses sequentially with an additional twist that set the reserve price 
for the second license equal to the selling price of the first. One firm then bid far more for the first license 
than it could possibly be worth if the firm had to compete in the telecommunications market with a rival 
holding a second license. The firm had rightly figured out that no rival would be willing to bid that high for 
the second license which therefore remained unsold – leaving the first firm without a rival operating the 
second license. The main uncertainty in this bidding process came from the auction design: sequential 
award of two licenses but at the same price.  
Source: adapted from Klemperer (2002 b) 
 
                                                 
6 The initial capital costs for this project were estimated at US$750 million (World Bank, 1998) and the 
government reimbursed up to US$2million. 
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Bidding is a non-cooperative game that involves at least three parties. The main party is 
naturally the authority organizing and setting the rules and procedures of the tender. The 
second party involves potential bidders competing for the project. The third party is 
represented by the lenders. Lenders provide financial resources in terms of debt or equity, 
and will not do so unless they are provided with sufficient guarantees of the project’s 
ability to service debt and yield a reasonable rate of return.  
To ensure certainty and predictability in the bidding process, tender rules and procedures 
should not be changed after the invitation for tenders has been issued. Certainty in 
bidding is equivalent to ensuring the “sanctity of the tender rules and procedures”. This 
is done through transparent decision making and robustness, consistency and 
completeness of the tender rules and procedures. Moreover, tender rules and procedures 
should ensure the selectivity of the bidding process. Selectivity in the bidding process is 
of primary importance to ensure that the outcomes of the project will be delivered to 
consumers and to the economy. But selecting a capable developer is not enough. The 
regulatory framework should also restrain the government and the winner’s ability to 
engage in future renegotiations. Indeed, the likelihood of renegotiations encourages 
opportunistic bidding strategies and undermines the need to organize a competitive tender 
in the first place (Guasch, 2004). A sound and effectively implemented bidding process 
should also impair bidders’ ability to collude. As shown in Box 4, this is less than 
obvious. For instance, the collusion case reported by Klemperer (2002) was facilitated by 
the auction design (simultaneous ascending auction) implemented for the 3-G licenses. 
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Box 4: New generation telecom licenses in Germany 
Klemperer (2002) provides a complete review of the 3G licenses auctioned by many European governments 
in the early 2000s. For instance, the German government decided to use a simultaneous ascending auction to 
sell ten blocks of spectrum rights. The auction rules strictly stated that any new bid on a spectrum block had 
to exceed the previous high bid by at least 10 percent. Mannesman, one of the bidders participating in this 
auction, bid 18.18 million DM per megahertz for blocks 1 to 5 and 20 million DM per megahertz for blocks 6 
to 10. T-Mobile, a competing bidder, interpreted the Mannesman’s bid for blocks 1 to 5 as an offer although 
there was no explicit agreement between the two firms. It seems that T-Mobil understood that if it bid 20 
million DM per MHz on blocks 1 to 5, and did not bid on blocks 6 to 10, the two firms would then live with 
neither company challenging the other on the other’s half.  
Source: adapted from Klemperer (2002) 
3. Adequacy of the tender design to the social and political context 
A good tender must reflect the socio-political context of the country as well as the 
peculiarities of the project. The procurement of PPI projects is politically sensitive. 
Because, PPI agreements are structured as risk sharing mechanisms, they are perceived as 
rent sharing mechanisms through which rents are redistributed between the project 
developer, the lenders, the government and eventually the consumers. The main rationale 
for organizing competitive tenders is to ensure fairness and equity in the way the rents are 
redistributed. Competitive tenders are therefore vulnerable to challenges brought by 
political opponents or social activists. Box 5 highlights such a situation in the case of the 
Cochambaba water concession project in Bolivia. Similar situations have been observed 
in many other countries7. In Algeria the second GSM license was caught up in political 
turmoil less than two years after being awarded because of the inability of the winner to 
quickly develop the services (Noumba, P., 2004). Similarly, the privatization of the 
power company in Senegal was terminated less than a year after being issued by the 
incoming government because of deficient performances. There are many other examples 
illustrating the political sensitivity of the concession of PPI projects. Competitive and 
transparent tenders can mitigate these political and social risks, but are not often 
sufficient to completely mitigate these risks. How to explain such mismatch? First, 
consumers and politicians have short terms goals, and make the most of their decisions 
on the basis of these short term goals, whereas the development of infrastructure projects 
                                                 
7 The government of New Zealand implemented a second price sealed-bid auction to sell radio spectrum. In 
one extreme case, the first bid proposed NZ$100,000 while the second bid only proposed NZ$ 6. The 
government stood by the rules and granted the radio spectrum bloc to the winner at the price proposed by 
the second. Clearly, such an outcome could be easily challenged by political opponents and ultimately 
undermine the bidding process. 
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needs time to deliver social and economic outcomes. Second, bidders are not always 
rationale risk takers, and often engage in aggressive bidding strategies which finally deter 
the economic and financial viability of the projects bid out. The combination of all these 
factors weakens the political or social support to bidding outcomes. What should 
governments do to minimize these perceptions and anticipation gaps? Tenders are simple 
market based mechanisms which can be used to implement development programs in 
infrastructure sectors. As mechanisms to allocate resources, tenders should reflect social 
and political concerns in order to minimize these gaps. As discussed in Box 5, there is 
little that could have been done by the bidding process to address the social unrest 
generated by a reform program designed without sound consultations with all the 
stakeholders. Bearing this in mind, governments should not only emphasize transparency 
in the bidding process, but should also emphasize transparency and participatory process 
in designing and implementing infrastructure reforms8. An effective consultation process 
would have improved the social dimensions of the concession agreement and would have 
preserved the Cochambaba water concession from collapsing.  
Box 5: Social unrest and the Cochabamba water concession 
In 1999, the government of Colombia awarded a 40-year water concession to a consortium led by 
International Water from UK which was unfortunately the only bidder for the concession. To grant this 
concession to the private sector, a new law (law 2029 – the drinking water and sanitation law) was enacted. 
The law not only facilitated private sector participation, but it also ended subsidies to the water sector. 
Subsidies were in practice eliminated in January 2000 leading to a substantial rate increase of water. 
Opposition to the concession was formalized in January 2000 when a group of Cochabamba citizens formed 
a coalition and organized massive strikes. The coalition published a declaration calling for the reduction of 
water prices, the repeal of the water act, a ban on privatization and the repeal of the Cochabamba 
concession.  The opposition to the reform grew stronger and stronger and ultimately led to the repeal of the 
water act in April 2000, as well as the withdrawal of International Water from the concession. 
Source: World Bank (2003) 
4. Effective regulation ex-post 
The main purpose of regulation after the project has been awarded is to ensure and 
preserve the “sanctity of the bids”. Regulation is an instrument or a mechanism used to 
hold contracting parties accountable for their respective commitments. For instance, the 
project developer should be held accountable of its bid, whereas the government should 
                                                 
8 Governments can also consider stakeholders’ participation in the bidding and decision making in order to 
mitigate these social risks. Of course, this entails the implementation of safeguard measures needed to 
preserve the confidentiality and integrality of the bidding process. 
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be restrained from acting unilaterally. Ensuring regulatory certainty and its predictability 
throughout the concession period is the most important role devoted to infrastructure 
regulators. Regulating the behavior of the contracting parties is critical to achieve the 
project outcomes. Concession contracts should be well designed and balanced with 
respect to contractual obligations (service coverage, investment obligations, quality, and 
information requirement). Any discretion left to the regulator should be restricted to 
issues not explicitly stated in the contract. Furthermore, regulatory decisions should be 
subject to appropriate and effective appeal mechanisms. A well designed concession 
contract followed by poor regulatory oversight leads to deficient sector performance. 
Similarly, effective regulation alone is not sufficient to fix problems stemming from a 
poorly designed contract. As shown in Guasch (2004), concession contract renegotiations 
are much more frequent than one would imagine. Among the most critical issues arising 
after the concession has been awarded are issues such as: request for price adjustment or 
increase by operators, request for price freeze or reduction by governments, claims for 
minimum revenues guarantees as a result of excessively optimistic demand forecasts, and 
request to revise the pricing formulae. Failing to deal effectively with these issues prior 
or during the bidding stage will inevitably lead to renegotiations and eventually to 
deficient performance. 
5. Picking the right bidding process 
In the previous sub-section, the main issues likely to affect the success of a bidding 
process have been reviewed. This sub-section focuses on the selection of a bidding 
process in order to address these issues. Competitive tenders can be divided into two 
groups. Group 1 involves one stage bidding processes, whereas group 2 involves two-
stage bidding processes. In some countries, such as the UK and France, a three-stage 
bidding process is allowed under procurement regulation. In these countries, the granting 
or competent authorities can organize a third biding round during which preferred bidders 
submit their best available financial offer (BAFO). In general, to initiate a bidding 
process, governments can issue an invitation for expression of interest (EOI) in order to 
establish the level and type of interest of a particular project. But, an expression of 
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interest is fundamentally different from a request for qualification (RFQ) as we will see 
in the case of a two-stage bidding process.  
a) One-stage bidding process 
A one stage-bidding process has at least two variants. In the first variant, proposals are 
solicited from interested developers (open bidding process). In the second variant, 
proposals are solicited from a restricted number of bidders (restricted bidding process). 
For restricted bidding processes, a short list of potential bidders is established on the 
basis of the experience, expertise and financial standing of each firm.  
 
In general, one-stage bidding processes do not involve a formal pre-qualification stage 
despite the establishment of a shortlist of potential bidders. Bids are submitted in sealed 
envelopes enclosing two envelopes including the technical and financial proposals. The 
first envelope encloses the technical proposal, whereas the second envelope encloses the 
financial proposal. In some countries, such as in Korea, there is only one proposal 
including technical and financial components. Bids are submitted on a specified date, 
time and venue. The evaluation of bids is done according to the specifications provided 
by tender rules and procedures. The weights attributed to the technical and financial 
proposals are stated in the tender documents in compliance with the national procurement 
guidelines. For example, if bidders are likely to rely on the same technology to deliver 
the objectives of the project and the tender documents do not call for any substantial 
technology innovation, then financial proposals can be weighted up to 70% of the total 
score. Conversely, if technology or technical requirements call for substantial innovative 
solutions, then technical proposals can be weighted up to 70% of the total score. In sum, 
the weight given to technical and financial proposals in the evaluation of bids should be 
decided in connection with the primary objectives of the project. The bidder obtaining the 
highest total score wins the project. The evaluation of one-stage bidding process is time 
consuming, and gives substantial discretion to the evaluation team to interpret, compare 
and score competing proposals.  
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b) Two-stage Bidding Process 
There are many variants of two-stage bidding processes. However, the main feature of a 
two-stage bidding process is to include a formal pre-qualification stage. The pre-
qualification stage is followed by the bid submission stage. As discussed earlier, the main 
objective of organizing a competitive bidding process is to select the project developer 
which is the most capable to deliver promised or anticipated outcomes in terms of 
services, prices, or coverage. In that context, the objective of the pre-qualification stage is 
to establish a list of technically and financially qualified bidders which can deliver the 
project development objectives. As opposed to restricted bidding discussed earlier in the 
case of one-stage bidding processes, the pre-qualification stage is a formal round of 
selection that aims to identify the most competent bidders. Only bidders meeting the 
requirements or criteria stated in tender documents will be invited to submit a bid. 
 
However, determining the right number of bidders is not simple. For example, a two-
stage bidding process that does not attract more than two bidders will not ensure enough 
competition in bidding. Similarly, a two-stage bidding process for which more than five 
bidders are qualified may not induce competition in bidding because the probability to 
win the bid decreases with the number of pre-qualified bidders. As a result, determining 
the right number of bidders is a strategic decision that should take into account an 
assessment of the market conditions, the probability that some of the pre-qualified 
bidders may drop out of the bidding, and the sector specific conditions. There is no 
analytical rule or methodology to decide on the right number of bidders.  
 
A study (ENGREF 2001) found that 3.5 bidders expressed their interest in tenders 
organized for the renewal of water concessions in France in 2000, of which 2.1 were 
qualified to submit bids. But, in 33% of the cases, there was only one bid submitted. 
Another World Bank study (Foster, V. 2005) made comparable or similar findings in 
reviewing water concessions in Latin American countries9. Chart#1 shows that the 
                                                 
9 Foster, V (2005, p. 13): “Not only has the number of bidders for Latin American water contracts been 
comparatively small, but they have always tended to come from the same handful of predominantly French 
companies.” 
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number of potential bidders for water concessions is limited to 2 or 3. With such a limited 
number of potential bidders, it is important to minimize the possibility of any bidder to 




Chart# 2 depicts the most important steps of a two-stage bidding process. The chart does 
not reflect the preparatory stage during which the government works closely with a team 
of advisors to define or decide on the project’s configuration.  
- The bidding process begins with the release of an expression of interest (EOI) by 
the government. The objective of an EOI is to check the interest of market players 
in a specific project being contemplated by the government. Potential bidders are 
given from 4 to 8 weeks to show their interest in the proposed project11. 
                                                 
10 For PPI projects, the following bonds may be required: (a) conforming bid bond to ensure that the bidder 
will submit a compliant bid – indicative amount #0.1 to 0.2% of capital costs – usually returned upon 
signature of the PPP agreement; (b) construction bond issued at financial close for the duration of the 
construction period – amount # 2.5 to 3% of capital costs; (c) performance bond issued at the 
commencement of the operating period – amount # 6 to 12 months of turn-over; (d) maintenance bond can 
also be required during the last years of the concession – project specific. 
11  The 4 to 8 weeks period allocated to EOI accounts for the need to assess the interest that potential 
investors may have on the project, and can be adapted to the size and complexity of the project. For 
Chart#1: Number of bidders in water concessions in LAC 
 
Source: Vivien Foster (2005), op. cit, p. 13. 
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- The government then issues the pre-qualification rules and procedures as well as 
the request for qualification (RFQ). The pre-qualification documentation may also 
include any other relevant documentation on the project, the legal and regulatory 
framework, and the macro-economic trends. 
- Firms are given 3 to 6 weeks to prepare and submit their pre-qualification 
proposals. The government reviews the proposals and appoints the pre-qualified 
bidders. To ensure transparency, the evaluation prepared to support the 
qualification of firms should also be made public. 
- After the pre-qualified bidders are known, the government can organize a formal 
consultation process to finalize the bidding documents12. The consultation process 
is done according to the tender rules and procedures and should help to ensure the 
adequacy of bidding documents to the market conditions and bidders’ 
expectations. The consultation process can take between 8 and 16 weeks 
depending on the complexity of the project. 
- The finalization of the bidding documents leads to the issuance of the request for 
proposals (RFP) or invitation for tenders. Pre-qualified bidders are given 8 to 12 
weeks to prepare and submit compliant bids. 
- The selection step in two-stage bidding process can be organized around two 
options. In option 1, bidders are requested to submit a bid enclosing technical and 
financial proposals. Both proposals are reviewed and evaluated according to 
criteria stated in the bidding documents. The bidder obtaining the highest score 
(technical and financial) wins the project or the concession. Such a selection 
scheme was successfully implemented in Morocco for the award of the second 
GSM license in 199913. In option 2, which is illustrated in Chart 2, bidders are 
requested to submit bids enclosing their best available offer based on specified 
criterion or a combination of criteria. Bids are submitted, and opened and 
evaluated the same day. The negotiation of the concession agreement or contract 
                                                                                                                                                 
example, the granting authority can use that period to collect additional market and technical information 
required for the finalization of the project’s specification. 
12 - Only pre-qualified bidders are allowed to participate to these round of consultations. 
13 - The license was granted to a consortium led by Telefonica (Spain) for US$1.1billion. For this tender, 
the weights of technical and financial proposals were set at 40 and 60% of the total score respectively. 
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can last from 6 to 12 weeks before the contract is signed. The final closure of the 
transaction can quickly follow when the sponsors have been successful to secure 
all the financing needed to develop the project. Usually, this step takes more time 
to close (see the Ashkelon project discussed in Box 2). 
    
 
Table 1 provides a sample of selection criteria used in contemporary PPI tenders. As 
noted in Guasch (2004), governments are well advised to use a well crafted criterion to 
select the winning bidder. For example, the privatization of the electricity distribution 
company in Lima (Peru) was decided on the highest dollar value offered for the assets, 
but relying on such criterion can result in higher user fees. The government may also 
overlook social concerns and focus only on raising fiscal revenues. Similarly, a criterion 
such as “maximum discount to existing tariffs” which has been used in the privatization 
of water concession in Buenos Aires (Argentina) may also lead to aggressive bidding, 
thus increasing the opportunity for renegotiations after a winner has been selected. In an 
international context where water tariffs do not recover costs, it is hard to expect tariff 
discount if the goals of the reform are to expand coverage, improve quality and 
efficiency. Governments should be able to assess the regulatory trade-offs when 
designing concession contracts in order to ensure a balance between consumption 
affordability, expansion targets, and financial sustainability of the service providers. It is 
well accepted that there is no free lunch. Consequently, one cannot simultaneously get 
Chart# 2: A timeline for a two-stage bidding process 
 































Source: Authors’ assessment. 
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lowest prices and ambitious coverage targets. Economic and financial models are 
important decision making tools that policymakers or regulators should use for the 
reconciliation of all these objectives 
 
   
III.  The procurement of PPI projects in Korea 
In the first section we reviewed the principles and the main issues affecting the design 
and implementation of the procurement of PPI projects. This section reviews the 
experience of Korea in the development of PPI projects, and discusses more specifically 
how these projects are procured. South Korea is an attractive country for private 
investment in infrastructure sectors. The country credit worthiness14, the availability of 
local currency lending and the established track-record in managing infrastructure 
projects are its main assets.  
A. PPI project development in Korea 
Since the early 1960s, Korea has demonstrated an impressive record of economic 
performance. Much of its success stems from a commitment to infrastructure 
                                                 
14 Standard and Poors sovereign rating for Korea:  A+ (local) ;  A- (foreign) 
Table 1: Examples of selection criteria 
Highest concession fee paid to 
government
Venezuela: Mobile telephony 
concession
Minimum margin on distribution 
required by the operator
Turkey: electricity distribution 
concession for Istanbul
Minimum toll and minimum one-
time subsidy
Chile : south access to Conception 
toll road
Lowest price (cents per kilowatt-
hour) of power to be supplied
Philippines: Power generation BOTs
Maximum discount to existing tariffsArgentina: Buenos Aires water 
concession
Highest dollar value offered for 
assets
Peru : Lima electricity distribution 
privatization
Structure of financial proposalInfrastructure transaction
 
Source: Guasch (2004). 
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development (Ro, Jaebong 2002)15. This success was facilitated by several factors 
including: strong leadership, efficient coordination for installing infrastructure facilities, 
and a well defined focus and priorities on infrastructure development. The government 
used a variety of public funding instruments to finance the development of infrastructure 
facilities. The main sources of funding for Korea’s infrastructure development included: 
taxation, designated funds (special accounts), public pension funds, and private funds. 
Public financing of infrastructure projects was progressively replaced by private 
investments as shown in Table 2. As of September 2002, 75% of PPI projects developed 
in Korea were financed by private investment and government subsidies represented 
around 25% of these investments. In fact, efforts to develop private investments in 
infrastructure were initiated in the early 1990s. 
 
Table 2: Financing sources of PPI projects (Central Government) as of September 2002 
 Total Investment Government 
subsidies 
Private equity Private debt Others 
KRW 
billion 
34,438 9,794 7,186 17,972 486 
% 100 25.5 20.9 52.2 1.4 
Source: PICKO. 
 
In 1994, the Private Capital Inducement Promotion Act was enacted to promote private 
participation in infrastructure, primarily Greenfield projects in transportation. This first 
PPI program was not a success because of substantial risks not properly mitigated. The 
government targeted 40 primary infrastructure facilities, but was only able to develop 
                                                 
15 For instance, immediately after the Korean War, Korea focused on developing light industries and the 
country’s import substitution capacity. Infrastructure to support these activities included the construction of 
275 kilometers of railways and several small highway projects. Furthermore, to stimulate its exports Korea 
continued the emphasis on infrastructure development by expanding railways, highways and ports. 
Although the priority devoted to developing modern infrastructure was important during the 1960s, it is 
only after the country had achieved full employment in the 1970s and when it shifted to heavy and 
chemical industries that comprehensive policies and plans to develop infrastructure were adopted by the 
government. These programs involved the construction of major airports, seaports, highways, railways, and 
telecommunications systems to support the increasingly important manufacturing sector. Because of 
continuous efforts of the government, investment in infrastructure recorded an average increase of 20% 
every year during the 1990s prior to the financial crisis. In 2001, the percentage of infrastructure 
expenditures in the national budget reached 14.6%. 
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five of them. PPI projects were grouped in two categories: category-1 and category-2 
projects. Category-2 projects included power generation plants, gas supply, bus terminals, 
tourism promotion areas, and sport complexes. Category-1 projects involved more 
strategic infrastructure projects such as roads, railways, subways, ports, airports, water 
supply and telecommunications. The private sector could obtain ownership only in 
category-2 projects. As a result, category-1 projects could be carried out only through 
Build Transfer Operate (BTO) scheme, whereas category-2 projects were eligible for a 
broader scope of options including Build Operate and Transfer (BOT), and Build 
Transfer and Lease. In July 1998, the Planning and Budget Committee announced 
policies to privatize 11 state enterprises including Korea Telecom and Korea Electric 
Power Corporation and Korea Gas Corporation, and to create a new regulatory 
framework for private participation in infrastructure. 
 
The PPI Act was enacted in 1999. The Act encouraged private participation in the power, 
gas, transportation, airports, ports, telecommunications, water and sewage sectors by 
providing tax and other incentives to private investors, and by improving the procurement 
process. The Act also included incentives for foreign investors such as: (i) a 10 percent 
value-added tax exemption, (ii) a government guarantee of up to 90 percent of operating 
revenues, (iii) a bonus for early completion of construction, (iv) the compensation for 
losses due to exchange rates fluctuations, (v) a buy-out option in case of force majeure. In 
addition, the Act abolished the former categorization of infrastructure projects and 
Box 6: Traditional Planning Institutions are no longer adequate. 
 
The Economic Planning Bureau (EPB) was the coordinating agency in the infrastructure decision 
making process. Its responsibilities covered a wide range of activities in infrastructure development 
and operations including the coordination of ministerial plans, making policy recommendations, 
and allocating budgets. Several other ministries were also responsible for planning and managing 
infrastructure, namely, the Ministry of Transportation for rail and ports; the Ministry of 
Construction for highways, housing, dams and water; the Ministry of Industry, Energy, and 
Resources for electricity and gas; the Ministry of Communications for telecommunications and the 
Ministry of Environment. Local governments were responsible for local and urban transportation. 
However, the President’s office – the core of the government’s power base – made the most 
important decisions. This extensive set of institutions served Korea well in the past, but does not 
seem to be adapted to help the country address the most critical issues raised by the expansion or 
modernization of infrastructure.  
Source: adapted from Jaebong Ro (2002), “Infrastructure development in Korea”, paper prepared 
for the PEO structure specialists meeting – Infrastructure development in the Pacific Region, 
September 23-24, Osaka, Japan, mimeo, 28 pages 
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enhanced transparency in the procurement of PPI projects. Moreover, the Act established 
PICKO as a specialized agency to provide technical assistance to competent authorities 
on the preparation of feasibility studies and on the preparation of PPI projects tenders. 
More specifically, PICKO16 was responsible for the review of feasibility studies prepared 
by competent authorities (ministries and local government), and was also in charge of the 
evaluation of bids. Finally, a ten-year PPI plan listing priority PPI projects was prepared 
by the government. The 10-year plan includes priority projects pre-identified as such and 
for which competent authorities have prepared pre-feasibility studies (see Annex I). 
Chart# 3 shows that local and central governments have been increasingly involved in 
developing PPI projects. These projects involved major urban infrastructures such as 
bridges, expressways, tunnels, and water treatment plants.  
 
Additionally, bank financing of PPI projects also increased tremendously. As shown in 
Chart# 4, bank financing of PPI projects reached a total of KRW 20,000 billion in 2002 
compared to KRW 2,500 billion in 1995 when the first PPI legislation was enacted. But 
                                                 
16 In January 2005, the government of Korea passed an amendment to the 1999 Act establishing PIMAC as 
the new PPI unit. The amendment also introduced the following changes: (a) inclusion of social 
infrastructure such as schools, housings in the list of sectors eligible to PPI, (b) introduction of BTL (Build 
Transfer and Lease), (c) creation of an Infrastructure Fund, (d) requirement to assess the value for money 
for all PPI projects, (d) PICKO of KRIHS and PIMA of KDI are merged into PIMAC to be hosted by KDI. 









































No of projects awarded Investment amount US$ bill.
 
Source: PICKO (2005) 
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most bank financing went to projects supported by the central government whereas the 
number of projects promoted by local governments has remained predominant. 
 
 
B. Procurement of PPI projects in Korea 
In Korea, the rules and procedures regulating the procurement of PPI projects are spelled 
out in the 1999 Act, and in its Enforcement Decree. This sub-section reviews these rules 
and procedures. 
1. One-stage bidding process 
According to the Act, competent authorities are responsible for the designation of 
concessionaires in charge to develop PPI projects. To do this, local governments must 
organize competitive tenders according to the rules and procedures spelled out in the 
enforcement decree of the 1999 Act. The procurement of PPI projects follows an open 
sealed-bid tender even though competent authorities can implement a pre-qualification 
stage. Consequently, the number of potential bidders remains unknown until the 
submission of bids. Furthermore, bids are made of one proposal which includes technical 
and financial components. In fact, the procurement rules do not differentiate technical 
from financial proposals. Proposals are prepared according to article 12 of the 
enforcement decree, and should reflect the following key elements:  
- contents of the project proposal including basic engineering plans 


















Source: Dailami (2004) 
 23
- details of the total project costs and financing plan 
- justifications for the cash-flow estimates 
- management and operation plans for the facility 
- justifications for expenditures plans and revenues estimates 
- contents for implementing supplementary projects 
- contents for subsidy request if any. 
Bids are evaluated according to a set of criteria spelled out in article 13 of the decree and 
summarized in Table 3. 
 
Table 3: Categories for the evaluation of bids 
 Content Score 
Category 1 Composition of the concessionaire, such as organization types, 
relationship between sponsors 
50 
Category 2 Feasibility of the project proposals, such as project costs, 
construction period, site, content of construction 
150 
Category 3 Financing plan, such as equity and debt financing capacity 300 
Category 4 Economic feasibility of the project, such as user fees, 
concession period, rate of return, scale of supplementary 
projects 
200 
Category 5 Facility management capability, such as the appropriateness of 
the maintenance plan, the operation and management plan, land 
acquisition 
200 
Category 6 Contribution to social benefits, such as the provision of services 
to the facility users 
100 
Total score  1000 
Source: PICKO (2004). 
Bids obtaining a total score below 600/1000 points or bids which do not score above 
60/100 point on category 3 are disqualified. The competent authority then selects at least 
two preferred bidders with which competitive negotiations are organized. Negotiations 
can involve up to 30 preparatory meetings which are followed by 5 to 7 negotiation 
rounds. The best available offer results from these negotiations which can take up to 52 
weeks. Overall, the procurement of PPI projects takes on average 4 years to complete 
whereas international experience shows an average timeline on or around 88 weeks.   
2. A legacy of civil works procurement 
Rules and procedures applied to the procurement of PPI projects are influenced by rules 
and procedures originally developed for the procurement of civil works. As shown in 
Table 3, the evaluation of bids relies heavily on the means (technical and financing) to be 
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mobilized by the project developer, whereas the procurement of PPI projects should be 
outcomes oriented. In Table 2, only 300 points over a total of 1000 points are allocated to 
assess the ability of potential bidders to deliver the outcomes of the projects. The rest of 
the evaluation concentrates on insuring that potential bidders can mobilize required 
means or resources to develop the PPI project. For example, category 4 is allocated 200 
points despite the fact of it involves most of the project development outcomes on which 
bidders should be kept accountable for. In Korea, outcome oriented criteria represent 
between 20% and 40% of the total evaluation’s score. This is very low in comparison to 
international best practices in the procurement of PPI projects. Furthermore, the public 
procurement agency can verify the project costs to ensure the appropriateness of unit 
prices whereas in a concession such a responsibility lies primarily with the project 
developer.  
C. PPI market inefficiencies 
This sub-section reviews the inefficiencies of the PPI market in Korea as these are 
perceived by most national and international observers. 
1. A high number of unsolicited proposals  
The Korean PPI market is characterized by an astonishingly higher number of unsolicited 
proposals. Between 1999 and 2003, the number of solicited projects grew from 7 to 12, 
whereas the number of unsolicited increased from 5 to 39. The multiplication of 
unsolicited proposals is quite difficult to explain. The first reason that one can suggest is 
the weak capacity of competent authorities. More specifically local governments are ill 
equipped to prepare the feasibility studies requested for the designation of PPI projects. 
Furthermore, most competent authorities do not have sufficient budget to contract out the 
preparation of such studies to specialized consultants. Because of these weaknesses, 
initiators of unsolicited proposals prepare feasibility studies and subsequently submit 
them to competent authorities as unsolicited proposals. The second reason relates to the 
fact the Korean procurement regulations do not formally exclude from unsolicited 
proposals, projects which have been included in the ten-year PPI plan. The designation of 
PPI projects follows a procedure specified by the enforcement decree (see Annex I). 
Under this procedure, preliminary feasibility studies must be prepared by competent 
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authorities to demonstrate the project eligibility to private investment participation. The 
10-year PPI plan therefore includes projects for which preliminary feasibility studies 
have been prepared, even though these projects are not yet designated PPI projects. 
Projects will be designated PPI projects only after the completion of conclusive 
feasibility studies. Consequently, until a project is designated as a PPI project by a 
competent authority, it can be presented as an unsolicited proposal. Private operators take 
advantage of this loophole. 
2. Domination of local construction firms 
The PPI market in Korea is dominated by five main construction and engineering firms: 
Samsung, Daewoo, Posco, Hyundai and Kumbo construction. The domination of these 
local firms is not surprising. Korean construction firms are globally very competitive on 
international markets, and are well positioned to dominate their domestic market. More 
interestingly, these firms provide the initial capital investment needed to develop PPI 
projects even though they are only interested in the construction phase of the project. 
Moreover, Korean construction firms establish consortia with the implicit objective to 
limit competition in downstream PPI projects tenders. The strong domination of local 
construction firms also explains the limited involvement of foreign firms. Out of 149 
projects awarded from 1994 to 2004, only 12 involved foreign firms. The participation of 
foreign firms is estimated at US$887million or 2.3% of the total PPI investment in 
Korea17. The low level of the participation of foreign firms is further explained by a 
variety of additional reasons.  
D. Options to improve the procurement of PPI projects in Korea 
Korea is facing two major challenges in its efforts to develop a vibrant PPI market. The 
first challenge is to eliminate the inefficiencies which are still characterizing its PPI 
market (cartelization, lack of world class developers, concentration in the supply market). 
The second challenge relates to government policies and more specifically to its current 
                                                 
17 Foreign participation is distributed between US$279million equity participation and US$642million debt 
participation. This includes 6 projects in roads or expressways, 1 harbor project, 2 light rail transport 
projects, 3 subways transit systems. 
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procurement rules and procedures. This section provides some recommendations to 
address inefficiencies identified.   
1. Make two-stage bidding process compulsory for large and complex 
PPI projects 
The procurement of PPI projects is about selecting the most capable project developers to 
deliver the project’s objectives. This implies two changes in the procurement regulations. 
The first change is to streamline the bidding process in a way that reduces the cost of 
preparation of compliant bids. The second change is to make two-stage bidding process 
compulsory for large and complex PPI projects. The introduction of a two-stage bidding 
process with a mandatory pre-qualification stage will be an effective tool to address 
issues pertaining to the cartelization of the supply, as well as enhancing the selectivity of 
project developers. Potential bidders will be screened and scrutinized against technical 
and financial requirements during the pre-qualification stage. Pre-qualified firms will 
submit bids on the basis of a well crafted criterion, thus streamlining the selection of the 
winner. Similarly, security mechanisms such as performance bonds, penalties for delays, 
incentives for improved performance and balanced contractual termination clauses will 
bring additional comfort to the government regarding the ability of the bidders to fulfill 
their commitments. As a result, the use of one-stage bidding process will be restricted to 
more straight forward or small scale PPI projects.  
2. Introduce more stringent regulations on unsolicited proposals 
The number of unsolicited proposals is abnormally high in Korea. Further research to 
understand why there are more unsolicited than solicited proposals in Korea would be a 
worthwhile exercise. Unsolicited proposals should be the exception and not the norm. For 
example, the Philippines’ BOT law conditions the eligibility of unsolicited proposals to 
the following criteria:  
(i) the project should be innovative (new concept or technology),  
(ii) the project should not be listed in the list of priority projects issued by the 
government;  
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(iii) the project should not involve any direct government guarantee, subsidy or 
equity;  
(iv) the government agency or the local government unit should publish an 
invitation for competitive proposals in a newspaper of general circulation;  
(v) the initiator of an unsolicited proposal does not receive any preferential 
treatment, even though she has the right to match any competitive offer that 
may be subsequently submitted.  
In Korea, the high number of unsolicited proposals illustrates the capacity of the private 
sector to opportunistically abuse the procurement guidelines. Thus, the need to restrict 
unsolicited proposals to innovative projects or PPI projects planned in economically 
disadvantaged regions. In order to reverse the observed trend, private sponsors should not 
be allowed to pick unsolicited projects from the PPI plan published by the government. 
Besides, the initiator of an unsolicited proposal should not be given any other preferential 
treatment than the right to match any competitive bid that might materialize.  
3. Introduce more stringent regulations on the formation of consortia 
International experience shows that many PPI projects have run into problems because 
the shareholders’ agreement did not stand the test of time. The long run sustainability of 
shareholders’ agreement is among the critical issues governments should be aware of, 
and should be able to address during the bidding process. Among possible regulations to 
be introduced, we suggest the following:  
• Request the incorporation of shareholders’ agreement in the tender documents. 
Doing this will provide the competent authority with relevant information about 
the allocation of responsibilities between sponsors. 
• Impose restrictive conditions (no change in shareholders for a minimum number 
of years, consent from granting authorities) on changes in shareholders to secure 
long term commitment of the project’s sponsors. 
• Request the incorporation of a dispute resolution mechanism in shareholders’ 
agreement. 
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• Request bid and performance bonds to contain the ability of sponsors to walk out 
of the project.  
The enforcement of these regulations will also limit the scope of collusion in the 
procurement of PPI projects.  
4. Enhance regulatory oversight on PPI contracts 
 A well designed PPI contract followed by a poor regulatory oversight leads inevitably to 
deficient sector performance. Although effective regulation is not a sufficient condition to 
fix all the problems arising from poor contract design, it is a powerful tool to ensure the 
sanctity of bids, and to hold the winning bidder and the government accountable. As 
shown by Guasch (2004), the existence of an autonomous regulatory agency has the 
largest marginal effect on the outcomes of PPI tenders. In Korea, regulatory oversight has 
been deficient in most infrastructure sectors, thus probably explaining the disappointing 
performance of some PPI projects as illustrated by the increasing claims of minimum 
revenue guarantees (Chart 5). 
 




























Source: Dailami (2004) 
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5. Shift government’s support from construction firms to project 
developers 
Korea still lacks world class project developers. The government faces a dilemma 
between relying on construction firms to develop the PPI market, and the need to ensure 
long term project viability by relying on world class project developers. Developing a 
world class category of project developers in Korea entails the combination of some of 
the measures already discussed. For example, the reliance on a two-stage bidding process 
and the introduction of more stringent regulations over the formation of consortia will 
direct bidders’ incentives towards setting-up special purpose entities with long term 
orientation.   
IV. Conclusion 
During the past 15 years most governments have implemented policies to promote private 
sector participation in infrastructure sectors. Korea has also relied on public-private 
partnership to expand and modernize its infrastructure facilities. Despite progress to date, 
important challenges still need to be addressed by the government to achieve the long-
term sustainability of the PPI program. The paper has shown that bidding out PPI projects 
is a complex, time consuming and a politically sensitive process, and has emphasized the 
need to ensure certainty, predictability and selectivity of the bidding process in order to 
reduce the costs of preparing compliant bids, and ultimately induce competition in 
bidding. The PPI market in Korea is still confronted by critical challenges involving 
market inefficiencies, such as the cartelization of the construction industry and the lack of 
capacity of most competent authorities to organize bidding processes and oversee 
concessionaires in charge of developing PPI projects. Korea also needs to address the 
inefficiencies characterizing the procurement of PPI projects. The paper suggests specific 
measures to address these inefficiencies such as: (i) shifting from a one-stage to a two-
stage bidding process in the case of large and complex PPI projects; (ii) introducing more 
stringent regulations on the formation of consortia and on unsolicited proposals; and (iii) 
enhancing the oversight of PPI contracts by developing effective regulatory institutions.   
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Annex I: Designation of PPI projects in Korea 
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Feasibility Studies
Designation of Projects 
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studies 
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Application for PPI Project 
Designation 
Designation and Public 
Notification of PPI project 
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Annex II: Procurement of PPI projects: Solicited Proposals 
Designation of PPI 
Projects
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Proposal 
Examination & Evaluation of 
Project proposal – Selection 
of winner 
Designation of concession 
Agreement 
Approval of Designs & Plans 





Approval & Design 




Annex III: Procurement of PPI projects - Unsolicited PPI Proposals 
Submission of Project Proposal 
Review of the project 
Content
Submission of opinion 
on the proposal
Request for Alternate 
Proposals 
No other Proposal Submitted Other Proposals Submitted 
Review & Evaluation of 
other proposals 
Designation of Potential 
concessionaires 
Designation of the initiator as 
Concessionaire 
Notification not to 
Implement 
No
Yes
